Reference

Limitations

The credibility of a proof system depends on stating plainly what it does not do. This page is authoritative; where it and marketing copy disagree, this page wins.

Preview, not shipping

External witnessing & transparency-log inclusion. Described on the Trust Services page as a preview. There is no implementation of independent witnessing or transparency-log submission in this codebase today. A certificate is currently self-signed by EVE only.
Cryptographic custody manifests / multi-party co-signing. Not implemented. All signing is single-party (Ed25519 by default).

Verification caveats

HMAC mode is not independently verifiable. A symmetric signature requires the shared secret. Only Ed25519 gives public-key, third-party verification.
Key attribution is out-of-band. Verifying a signature proves who signed (a key), not that the key is EVE's. Pin EVE's fingerprint through a trusted channel.
Replay id is not signature-bound in v3. Anti-replay and deterministic replay exist (core/coreguard/replay_guard.py, CLI/replay_verify.py), but the decision-chain coordinates are unsigned metadata rather than fields inside the signed record.

Claims we will not make without evidence

Latency ("sub-millisecond"). There is no benchmark in this repository that substantiates a specific latency figure; treat any such number as unverified until a repeatable benchmark ships.
No customer counts, certifications, or independent-audit claims are made here.

Scope of the quickstart evidence

The certificates in examples/quickstart/evidence/ are signed with a local development key. They are genuine and independently verifiable against that dev key, but they are not production evidence and are not externally witnessed. See examples/quickstart/evidence/PROVENANCE.md.