EVE — Product Architecture (16C)
Product hierarchy (one name per capability)
| Product | Scope |
|---|---|
| EVE CoreGuard | Deterministic pre-execution governance and enforcement (ALLOW / BLOCK / MODIFY). |
| EVE Proof | Signed evidence, decision certificates, offline & replay verification, verifier tooling, JCS-1. |
| EVE Agent Governance | Behavioral monitoring, sequence controls, budgets, approvals, framework adapters, agent runtime governance. |
| EVE MCP Governance | Authenticated MCP gateway, capability binding, approved-vs-executed request binding, replay protection, signed execution evidence. |
| EVE Artifact Governance | File ingestion, bounded parsing, deterministic scanning, quarantine/approval, substitution protection, signed scan evidence. |
| EVE Shadow | Candidate-policy simulation, historical replay, divergence analysis, signed reports, dry-run promotion readiness. |
| EVE Red Team | Customer-runnable adversarial regression testing, multi-step chains, zero-side-effect assertions, signed reports. |
| EVE Trusted Services | External witnessing, evidence custody, verifier services, assurance infrastructure where available. |
Architecture diagram (planes)
SDK & ADAPTER ENTRY POINTS
Python: from eve_coreguard import EVE TypeScript: import { EVE } from "@eve/coreguard"
Adapters (generic supported; framework adapters experimental) ─┐
│ normalized governed op
▼
┌───────────────────────────── CONTROL PLANE ──────────────────────────────┐
│ EVE CoreGuard ──► DETERMINISTIC DECISION BOUNDARY (no LLM in verdict) │
│ policy packs · risk · charter/veto ALLOW / BLOCK / MODIFY │
│ EVE Agent Governance: behavioral monitoring · sequence controls · budget │
│ EVE MCP Governance: authenticated identity · capability binding │
│ EVE Artifact Governance: media detection · safe parsing · scan policy │
└───────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
decision (ALLOW) + single-use authorization │ (BLOCK/QUARANTINE ⇒ stop)
▼
┌───────────────────────────── EXECUTION PLANE ─────────────────────────────┐
│ MCP boundary: reconstruct executed request ⇒ approved==executed digests │
│ atomic single-use consume ⇒ THEN the side effect (once) │
│ Artifact boundary: scan before ingestion/use; substitution rejected │
│ Tool/agent boundary: guarded call executes only on ALLOW │
└───────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
│ every decision & execution
▼
┌───────────────────────────── EVIDENCE PLANE (EVE Proof) ──────────────────┐
│ signed, JCS-1-canonicalized evidence (Ed25519 prod / HMAC fallback) │
│ decision certificate · monitoring envelope · MCP execution evidence · │
│ shadow report · artifact scan evidence · red-team report │
└───────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────┘
▼
INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION (does NOT trust the EVE server)
Python · Node · Browser verifiers → {valid, reason, signature}
Boundaries, plainly
- CoreGuard decision boundary — a deterministic verdict is computed before execution.
- MCP boundary — the approved request is bound to the executed request; mutation ⇒ block.
- Artifact boundary — files are scanned before ingestion/use; substitution is rejected.
- Evidence plane — every decision/execution emits signed evidence.
- Independent verification — anyone can verify evidence offline, without trusting EVE.
Readiness
Pilot-validated architecture; SDK core is a RELEASE CANDIDATE WITH EXCLUSIONS. See readiness.md.
Limitations
MCP binding provides at-most-once authorization consumption, not remote exactly-once
execution. jcs-1 is a constrained profile. Framework adapters (except generic) are
experimental. The pip client governs via hosted mode.